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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
K. J. and RUTH ACHTER et. al. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Vo, 
THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, an agency of the 
State of Utah, 
Defendant/ Appellee 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
Case No. 20040050-CA 
Defendant/Appellee, Utah Department of Transportation, by and through counsel, 
submits the following Brief in response to the Brief of Appellants. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (2003). This 
appeal has been reassigned to the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (2003). 
ISSUES TO BE DECIDED 
(1) What is the statutory meaning of "proceeding" as used in 49 CFR § 24.107, 
and 
(2) Whether the Plaintiffs in this case (Appellants) were ever parties to the relevant 
"proceeding." 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is an issue of 
law, and as a result is reviewable on appeal by the de novo standard of review, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. During the 1980s the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") 
determined that the Highway 89 corridor between Farmington and South Ogden needed 
widening and other improvements to increase public safety. As required by the National 
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), UDOT prepared an Environmental Impact 
Statement ("EIS"), published September 9, 1996, which identified that approximately 136 
homes and 22 businesses would be affected by the widening of the Highway 89 corridor. 
2. Subsequent to the publication of the EIS, certain property owners along the 
Highway 89 corridor became concerned that because their property had been identified in 
the EIS, it had diminished in value. 
3. On November 18, 1997, 14 months after the publication of the EIS, three 
property owners identified as Robinson, Scadden, and Reichel filed an inverse 
condemnation case against UDOT in the Second District Court, hereinafter referred to the 
"Robinson case." (Robinson v. State, Civil No. 970700784, Second Judicial District 
Court, Davis County.) 
4. During the 1998 General Legislative Session, the Utah Legislature 
appropriated $10 million to UDOT for the purpose of "corridor preservation," which 
monies were to be applied to hardship cases along the Highway 89 corridor. 
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5. In February, 1998, UDOT began settlement negotiations with affected 
property owners along the Highway 89 corridor. 
6. A "Stipulation to Dismissal" of the Robinson case was signed by counsel 
for UDOT on March 19, 1998, and by counsel for the plaintiffs case on March 24, 1998. 
The Stipulation dismissed the Robinson case, but preserved the issue of attorneys fees to 
be awarded to plaintiffs' counsel and the issue of future potential class action litigation. 
(Stipulation of Dismissal is attached hereto as Exhibit A.) 
7. On March 16, 1998, Plaintiffs counsel filed an Amended Complaint in the 
Robinson case with the Second District Court entitled "Amended Complaint for Inverse 
Condemnation along the Highway 89 Corridor, a Class Action." No motion was filed 
with the Amended Complaint requesting leave of the Court to amend, pursuant to Rule 15 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ("URCP"), nor was a motion filed seeking a class 
certification, pursuant to Rule 23, URCP. 
8. On March 24, 1998, Defendant UDOT filed an objection to the Amended 
Complaint, citing Rule 15, URCP, as the basis for the objection. 
9. Neither the Amended Complaint nor the class certification issue was ever 
acted upon by the Second District Court. 
10. The issue of Plaintiffs' attorneys fees in the Robinson case subsequently 
became a matter before the Utah Supreme Court in Robinson v. Utah Dept. of 
Transportation, 20 P.3d 396 (Utah 2001). The Supreme Court remanded the case to the 
Second District for determination of appropriate attorneys fees. (Attached as Exhibit B.) 
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11. In the remanded case, UDOT filed a Motion in Limine to preclude evidence 
of attorneys fees other than the named plaintiffs in the Robinson case. 
12. Pursuant to the Motion in Limine, Judge Glenn R. Dawson, of the Second 
District Court, signed an Order on March 19, 2002, stating that "this court has no 
jurisdiction in this action over any person except the four property owners bound by the 
stipulation," and that "attorneys fees are recoverable in this matter, only on behalf of the 
four property owners . . . " (Order on Motion in Limine, p. 2.) (Attached hereto as Exhibit 
C.) 
13. Having been precluded by Judge Dawson's Order, from presenting 
evidence as to attorneys fees for parties not named in the Robinson case - though that 
Order is subject to appeal - Plaintiffs' counsel filed the subject lawsuit. 
14. Plaintiffs' Complaint was dismissed by the Honorable Sheila McCleve, by 
Order dated December 12, 2003, resulting in this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Having been precluded from presenting evidence in the Second District Court as to 
attorneys fees for parties not named in the Robinson case, Plaintiffs' counsel wants a 
second bite at the apple, resulting in this case. 
On its face, the obvious first question is whether Plaintiffs' claim even rises to the 
level of a regulatory inverse condemnation case, given that an EIS is part of the UDOT 
planning process, and mere planning in anticipation of condemnation, without more, does 
not constitute a taking. 
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However, that issue does not have to be decided, however, because the language of 
the regulation governing, upon which Plaintiffs rely, is so clear, and the cases deciding 
this issue are so consistently uniform, that the determination can easily be made that 
because the Plaintiffs in this action were never parties to an inverse condemnation 
lawsuit, they are not entitled to an award of attorneys fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DO THE FACTS EVEN WARRANT THE PLAINTIFFS' PROPERTY 
BEING A SUBJECT OF INVERSE CONDEMNATION? 
Plaintiffs' entire case is based on the assumption that Plaintiffs' properties were 
the subject of an inverse condemnation by UDOT. Yet no court has made that 
determination and UDOT strenuously denies it. The question is, whether a 14-month 
lapse between the publication of the EIS and the filing of the lawsuit constitutes a 
sufficient delay to warrant a finding of inverse condemnation. But it is not necessary to 
answer that question given the language of the regulation upon which Plaintiffs rely and 
the cases interpreting that regulation, as set forth hereinafter. 
Nonetheless, to put the matter in perspective, UDOT is a state agency responsible 
for the construction and maintenance of federal and state highways in the state of Utah. It 
engages in road widening on a continual basis and condemns approximately 1,200 to 
1,300 parcels of property each year. All road construction or road widening cases using 
federal funds require the publication of an EIS prior to the commencement of 
construction. An EIS is part of the planning activities mandated by NEPA, which UDOT 
5 
is subject to following. The publication of an EIS is not a final decision by UDOT. 
Based upon the EIS, UDOT may decide to alter a project, abandon it, or proceed. The 
EIS is just one step in the planning process for the widening of a highway. 
The rule has long been established that mere planning in anticipation of 
condemnation does not, without more, constitute a taking.1 The United States Supreme 
Court has explicitly held that pre-condemnation activities do not constitute takings. The 
Court has stated: 
Appellants also claim that the city's precondemnation 
activities constitute a taking. The State Supreme Court 
correctly rejected the contention that the municipality's good-
faith planning activities, which did not result in successful 
prosecution of an eminent domain claim, so burdened the 
appellants' enjoyment of their property as to constitute a 
taking. Even if the appellants' ability to sell their property 
was limited during the pendency of the condemnation 
proceeding, the appellants were free to sell or develop their 
property when the proceedings ended. Mere fluctuations in 
value during the process of governmental decision making, 
absent extraordinary delay, are incidents of ownership. They 
cannot be considered as a taking in the constitutional sense. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n. 9 (1980) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). See also Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285, 60 S.Ct. 231, 84 
L.Ed. 240 (1939) (stating that "[a] reduction or increase in the value of property . . . by 
reason of legislation for or the beginning or completion of a project" does not constitute a 
*See the annotation entitled "Plotting or Planning in Anticipation of Improvement 
as Taking or Damaging Property Affected," 37 A.L.R. 3d 127 (1971). 
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taking). The Supreme Court later cited Agins and Danforth with approval for the 
proposition that "depreciation in value of property by reason of preliminary activity is not 
chargeable to the government." First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale 
v. County of Los Angeles. 482 U.S. 304, 320 (1987). 
There is a long standing legal distinction between physical takings and regulatory 
takings. In the subject case, there was no physical taking of any of the property owners' 
properties. There was only an identification that a potential taking was possible at some 
time in the future. Frankly, any property adjacent to a major thoroughfare is subject to a 
potential taking at some time in the future. Defendant does not question, though, that 
there became a cloud of uncertainty over the status of Plaintiffs' properties once the EIS 
was published. But that happens every time government contemplates a project requiring 
condemnation. 
Though not entirely analogous, the United States Supreme Court held in Tahoe-
Sierra Preservation Council Inc., et. al. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency et. aL, 535 
U.S. 302 (2002), that a moratoria totaling 32 months, while the Regional Planning 
Agency formulated a comprehensive land use plan for the Lake Tahoe area, did not 
constitute a taking of the property owners' property without just compensation. As the 
Court stated: "a rule that required compensation for every delay in the use of property 
would render routine government processes prohibitively expensive or encourage hasty 
decision making." IdL at 343. 
7 
As Justice Holmes noted in Pennsylvania Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) 
"government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be 
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law." Id. at 413. 
II. THE LANGUAGE OF 49 CFR 24.107 CLEARLY INDICATES THAT 
"PROCEEDING" MEANS LITIGATION AS THAT TERM IS USED IN 
THE REGULATION. 
The basis of Plaintiffs' claim for the award of attorneys fees is 49 CFR Part 
24.107.2 (Attached hereto as Exhibit D.) In its entirety, the regulation reads: 
§ 24.107 Certain litigation expenses.3 
The owner of the real property shall be reimbursed for any 
reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney, appraisal, 
and engineering fees, which the owner actually incurred 
because of a condemnation proceeding, if: 
(a) The final judgment of the court is that the Agency cannot 
acquire the real property by condemnation; or 
(b) The condemnation proceeding is abandoned by the 
Agency other than under an agreed-upon settlement; or 
(c) The court having jurisdiction renders a judgment in favor 
of the owner in an inverse condemnation proceeding or the 
Agency effects a settlement of such proceeding. (Emphasis 
added.) 
249 CFR § 24.107 has been adopted wholesale as part of UDOT's state regulatory 
scheme, see Rule 933-1-1, Utah Admin. Code. 
3Though not controlling, even the title of the regulation suggests that the 
reimbursement of attorneys fees are for "litigation expenses." 
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Because a final judgment of the court was not rendered in the Robinson case and 
UDOT agency did not abandon the project, neither subsection (a) or (b) apply. However, 
subsection (c) would be applicable. According to subsection (c), an owner of real 
property can only recover attorneys fees if one of two outcomes occurs. First, the owner 
can recover attorneys fees if a court having jurisdiction over an inverse condemnation 
proceeding renders a judgment in favor of the owner. For a court to have jurisdiction 
over, or to render a judgment in a condemnation proceeding, that proceeding must be a 
lawsuit. Defendant cannot conceivably think of a situation in which a court would have 
jurisdiction over a matter that was not a lawsuit. Secondly, an owner can recover 
attorneys fees if the agency affects a settlement of such proceeding. "Such proceeding" 
inescapably refers to the "proceeding" previously mentioned - which proceeding is 
clearly a lawsuit because it is before a court. 
The issue here is not what is the dictionary definition of "proceeding." The 
question is how is that term used in the regulation. Plaintiffs want to say that the term 
"proceeding" has a broad definition in the law. Defendant does not dispute that point. 
But it goes without saying that for a court to have jurisdiction over a matter requires a 
lawsuit. Clearly "proceeding" in subsection (c) means litigation if the court is to have any 
jurisdiction at all. 
Because the Second District Court never granted leave to amend Plaintiffs' 
Complaint, and never certified the case as a class action, Plaintiffs in this case were not 
party plaintiffs in the Robinson case. Therefore, the Plaintiffs in this case have never 
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been parties to an inverse condemnation "proceeding" as that term is used in 49 CFR 
24.107. 
IIL CASES INTERPRETING "PROCEEDING" UNDER 42 U.S.CA. 4654(c) HOLD 
THAT PRE-LITIGATION ATTORNEY'S FEES ARE NOT RECOVERABLE, 
Plaintiffs' Brief takes the position that Defendants, by interpreting "proceeding" to 
mean a lawsuit, are defining the term too narrowly (Brief at 21), or being too 
"hyper-technical" (Brief at 15), or engaging in "procedural maneuvering" (Brief at 17). 
To support their position they cite a 1951 New Jersey case (interpreting a New Jersey 
statute), a 1913 Territory of Hawaii case (interpreting a Hawaii statute), and a 1980 
Minnesota case (interpreting a Minnesota statute), none of which deal with 49 CFR § 
24.107 or inverse condemnation (Plaintiffs' Brief at 17). 
Conversely, Defendants, in equating the term "proceeding" with an actual 
"lawsuit" or "action," have relied upon court decisions dealing with inverse 
condemnation actions under § 4654(c) of the Uniform Relocation Property Acquisitions 
Act ("URA").4 Section 4654(c) reads: 
The court rendering judgment for the plaintiff in a proceeding 
brought under section 1346(a)(2) or 1491 of title 28, awarding 
compensation for the taking of property by a Federal agency, 
or the Attorney General effecting a settlement of any such 
proceeding, shall determine and award or allow to such 
plaintiff, as a part of such judgment or settlement, such sum as 
will in the opinion of the court or the Attorney General 
reimburse such plaintiff for his reasonable costs, 
4
 42 U.S.CA. 4601-4655. 
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disbursements, and expenses, including reasonable attorney, 
appraisal, and engineering fees, actually incurred because of 
such proceeding. (Emphasis added.) 
The regulation found at 49 CFR § 24.107, which Plaintiffs rely upon for recovery 
of their fees, was enacted by the office of the Secretary of Transportation to comply with 
§ 4654(c) of the URA. Court cases interpreting § 4654(c) of the URA, have unanimously 
held that pre-litigation expenses are not recoverable. As Plaintiffs note in their brief, 
"wholesale adoption, by one jurisdiction, of legislative language from another jurisdiction 
also presumptively adopts statements of underlying legislative purpose and judicial 
interpretations of legislative intent, see De Baritault v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 913 P.2d 743 
(Utah 1996); State v. Powasnik, 918 P.2d 146 (Utah App. 1996)." (Plaintiffs' Brief at 16 
n.5.) 
In Swisher v. United States, plaintiffs petitioned under the URA to recover costs 
and attorney's fees incurred for such litigation. 262 F. Supp. 2d. 1203, 1206 (D. Kan. 
2003). Initially, plaintiffs' counsel sought to bring a class action on behalf of several 
plaintiffs. kL at 1209. However, the Court subsequently severed the claims of the original 
plaintiffs, leaving only the Swishers as parties to the action. The District Court held 
specifically that legal services rendered on behalf of clients prior to class certification 
could not be attributed to the claim later settled on behalf of the named clients. The Court 
reasoned that to be reasonable and hence recoverable, attorneys' fees must "accurately 
reflect expenses attributable to plaintiffs' counsel's work on behalf of plaintiffs in this 
case?" IdL at 1210 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Court reasoned that although there 
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may be charges (incurred before the parties were severed) which would have been 
incurred had the named plaintiffs brought the instant action only, such charges should be 
reduced by one-ninth (the proportion of named to unnamed plaintiffs). Id at 1209. The 
Court further stated that "'pre-litigation expenses are precluded from reimbursement 
under 42 U.S.C. § 4654 (c),'" (quoting Emenv v. United States. 526 F.2d 1121,1124 (Ct. 
CI. 1975)). 
In a similar case, City of Austin v. Travis County Landfill, Co., a landowner 
brought an action against the city, alleging that the city's operation of civilian flights 
through his property's airspace constituted a taking. 25 S.W.3d. 191, 194-97 (Tex. App. 
1999) {reversed on other grounds). The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court, 
holding that there was a taking but that there was no statutory authority through which to 
award such fees because "[Recovery of attorneys' fees is adverse to the common law and 
penal in nature, and statutes providing for such recovery must be strictly construed." Id at 
201, 206. The Court reasoned that the "[URA] is a federal statute that provides for the 
recovery of litigation expenses, including attorney's fees, by plaintiffs who instigate 
inverse condemnation proceedings under section 1346(a)(2) or 1491 of Title 28 of the 
United States Code." Id at 207 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Court pointed out, § 
4654 provides authority for the award of expenses and attorney's fees "in actions brought 
in either federal court or the Court of Federal Claims." Id (emphasis added). 
In Emeny v. United States, owners of property sought to recover expenses incurred 
in an action which awarded them compensation for the United States' storage of helium 
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in a structure located on their property. 526 F.2d 1121, 1123 (Ct. CI. 1975). The United 
States Court of Claims held that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to recover costs and 
attorney fees incurred in ascertaining the nature and extent of their property rights in the 
gas storage capacity of the structure. Id. at 1124. The Court said that "the plain language 
of 42 U.S.C. § 4654 (c) precludes the court from including in its award to the plaintiffs 
any reimbursement for expenses incurred by the plaintiffs before they decided to file suit 
in the Court of Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1491." Id 
In Preseault v. United States, property owners petitioned for attorney's fees and 
expenses pursuant to the URA after prevailing on a takings claim. 52 Fed. CI. 667, 669-
70 (2002). The Court held that "Section 4654(c) does not provide for the reimbursement 
of expenses incurred by plaintiffs before their decision to file suit in the Court of Federal 
Claims." Id at 671. The Court reasoned that "[ljike the plaintiff who unsuccessfully 
attempts to negotiate a resolution of his controversy with the Government prior to 
bringing a takings claims, see Emeny% 526 F.2d at 1124, a plaintiff who seeks to reverse 
the taking on other grounds cannot recover compensation for expenses incurred to that 
end under the URA." Id at 672. The Court further reasoned that although it usually does 
not second-guess plaintiffs determination of what costs are reasonable, where a large 
proportion of the allowable fees are incurred after liability is determined and recovery 
under the URA is triggered, the Court cannot defer to the discipline of the market and 
must analyze such fees for reasonableness. See, id. at 680. 
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In Grantwood Village v. United States, a town which settled a suit it brought 
against the United States claiming that the National Trails System Act effected a taking 
from the town, requested expenses and attorney's fees for such litigation. 55 Fed. CI. 481, 
483 (2003). The Court held that the plaintiffs could not be reimbursed for costs associated 
with the quite title action prior to filing their complaint, saying that "[o]nly those costs 
attributable to the litigation itself are compensable under the URA." IdL at 484-486. The 
Court further held that the "URA permits a plaintiff to be reimbursed for reasonable fees 
and costs which are 'actually incurred because of such proceeding [referring to the taking 
law suit].'" Id at 484 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4654(c). The Court also noted that "[t]his can 
include expenses incurred in preparation of a complaint." Id (citing Yancey v. United 
States. 915 F.2d 1534, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
In Yancey, turkey farmers filed suit for reimbursement of healthy turkey breeder 
stock which was sold at a reduction in value as a result of a quarantine imposed by 
USDA. 915 F.2d at 1536. The Court cited Emeny, 526 F.2d at 1124 for the proposition 
that "pre-litigation expenses are precluded from reimbursement under 42 U.S.C. § 
4654(c)" and cited Clovenport Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 10 CI. Ct. 121, 124 
(1986) for the proposition that "'the significant effort expended' in 'the filing of the 
petition' may be compensable under the statute if proper documentation were provided." 
Id at 1543. 
Like most of the original plaintiffs in Swisher who were never certified as a class 
and therefore were not parties to the relevant proceeding, none of the Appellants were 
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certified as members of a class to the Highway 89 takings proceeding (the Robinson 
case), and consequently never became plaintiffs in such litigation. Therefore, any 
"expenses attributable to the plaintiffs' counsel's work on behalf of' the Appellants, who 
are "not plaintiffs to this case" are neither reasonable nor recoverable. The Court in 
Swisher made a particular point of excluding any fees attributable to unnamed plaintiffs. 
It even reduced attorney's fees (incurred before the claims were severed), which the Court 
acknowledged may have been incurred even if the plaintiffs "sought to bring the instant 
action only." 
Each of the courts in the authorities cited herein use the term "proceeding" 
interchangeably with "action," "litigation," "suit," "case," etc. There is no precedence for 
an award of attorney's fees to persons who were not parties to the inverse condemnation 
action. In fact the nature of the Robinson inverse condemnation proceeding was defined 
by the Utah Supreme Court in its award of attorney's fees to the named plaintiffs in the 
proceeding: "[t]he Utah Administrative Code mandates an award of plaintiff s attorney 
fees where UDOT settles the plaintiffs inverse condemnation action. " Robinson at 402. 
IV. PLAINTIFFS ERR IN ALLEGING THAT "THE LOWER COURT ERRED 
IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA:' 
Plaintiffs want to make hay out of the fact that the trial court addressed the issue of 
res judicata. Plaintiffs err. The issue of res judicata was raised by Defendant in its 
original "Motion to Dismiss," as an alternative theory. Defendant felt so strongly about 
its position regarding the language of 49 CFR § 24.107 and the cases cited above 
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interpreting the term "proceeding," that it wanted to preclude Plaintiffs from responding 
by saying "oops, maybe we were parties in the Robinson case." 
If they took that position, then Defendant wanted to make it clear that the matter 
had already been ruled upon by the Second District Court, and was not a matter to be 
reconsidered by the Third District Court. Defendant said in its Motion to Dismiss: 
It is Defendants' firm position that the Plaintiffs in this action 
are not entitled to the recovery of attorneys fees because they 
were never certified as class members in the 1997 inverse 
condemnation proceeding, and therefore have never brought a 
lawsuit and were never part of the settlement of the 1997 case. 
However, were this Court to find that for some reason 
Plaintiffs in this case were to be treated as plaintiffs in the 
earlier action, then Plaintiffs claims are also precluded by res 
judicata. Judge Dawson has already heard and ruled on the 
claims brought by Plaintiffs in this action. 
(Motion to Dismiss at 8). 
The order of the court likewise follows the alternative theory. The order says: "If 
the Plaintiffs though not certified as a class and not named in the previous action, were 
parties to that action, then they are bound by the Second District Court's ruling by the 
doctrine of res judicata and the appropriate remedy is an appeal of that ruling." (Order of 
Dismissal at 4). 
The point is Plaintiffs are trapped either way: If the term "proceeding" as used in 
the regulation actually means "lawsuit," and Plaintiffs were not parties to the original 
Robinson lawsuit, then they cannot recover attorneys fees under the regulation. 
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Alternatively, if they then claim to be parties in the Robinson case in the present lawsuit, 
then the Second District Court ruling applies. 
No error was made by the Third District Court in following that logic. 
CONCLUSION 
The term "proceeding" as used in 49 CFR 24.107 clearly references a lawsuit, and 
the court cases interpreting the same concur. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs complaint does not state a cause of action upon which relief 
can be granted, and should be dismissed. The Third District Court's ruling should be 
affirmed, 
DATED this L(o day of July, 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
FARMINCTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
KAY K. ROBINSON; VANE R. and ! 
MARiLEEL. SCADDEN; BENJAMIN E. 
and LE JOIE REIC11EL; acting in their own 
behalf and for all other paitics interested or 
otherwise similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAI1 and its agency 1 HE 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTA1 ION, 
Defendant. 
SI IPULAI ION "10 DISMISSAL 
Case No. 970700484 
Judge 
Come Now the PLAINTIFFS and the DEFENDANT, and STIPULA 1E10 
DISMISSAL of Plaintiffs' Complaint as follows. 
L The Parties to the above entitled action desire by this STIPULAI ION to fully resolve 
all issues raised in the Complaint and to settle all claims and defenses which are the subject 
matter of this dispute. This STIPULATION should be construed in the nature of an offer to 
compromise and settle the claims Plaintiffs assert against Defendant. As such, the relevant 
portions of Rule 408 of the Rules of Evidence are applicable. 
2. This STIPULATION shall be binding upon the plaintiffs and Harland and Ardena 
Taylor, which constitute the names identified by Plaintiffs counsel at a meeting on December 
16, 1997, in which Defendant agreed to a resolution of the above captioned case. All references 
to Plaintiffs or parties in this Stipulation shall include the named Plaintiffs and Mr. and Mrs. 
Taylor. No other parties shall be added to this litigation, or be governed by the terms of this 
Stipulation other than those listed in this paragraph. 
3. Any possible class action claims or possible class members will not be affected or 
prejudiced by this Stipulation, and this Stipulation is not intended to preclude subsequent 
litigation being brought by any person concerning the same or similar alleged class of claims. 
4. Pending the completion of the obligations of each party as set forth hereafter, all 
rights, defenses and obligations of each Plaintiff and the Defendant under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and the laws of Utah shall be held in abeyance without waiver or prejudice to either 
party. 
5. This Stipulation to Dismissal shall be subject to court approval pursuant to the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be submitted to the Court for approval prior to further 
implementation of the terms herein. 
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6. Upon the successful implementation and completion of all duties and actions required 
of the parties in this Stipulation, each Plaintiff and the Defendant shall make a joint motion for 
dismissal of this action indicating to the court that the Stipulation has been fully implemented as 
to that Plaintiff, and asking the Court to dismiss the matter with prejudice. 
7. The Plaintiffs have done the following: 
A. Requested that the Defendant (UDOT) acquire the Plaintiffs' properties due 
to hardships which are individual and particular to them and which they allege are a result of 
their need to sell their property and potential for future condemnation and which they allege 
make it difficult to obtain a fair value for their properties; and 
B. Submitted to the Defendant the addresses and legal descriptions of the 
properties owned by each Plaintiff, and the names and address of the owners of record. 
B. Met with their counsel to review the amount of the appraisal. 
8. The Defendant (UDOT) has done the following: 
A. The Plaintiffs' properties have been approved for acquisition by the State 
Transportation Commission (Commission) at its regular meeting held December 17, 1997, to be 
acquired as far as money in the existing funds (available from rental car sales tax) for hardship 
acquisitions permits. 
B. The Defendant has met with each of the Plaintiffs at the properties, and the 
properties have been appraised in accordance with the requirements of the Uniform Relocation 
3 
Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Act (Uniform Act). 
C. All of the Plaintiffs have been advised that the appraisals are completed. 
9. The Defendant (UDO 1) shall do the following: 
A. Present the appraisal and offer to purchase to the Plaintiffs, with counsel. A 
copy of the appraisal and offer will be left with the Plaintiff and counsel. The offer shall be 
made at a time and place convenient to Plaintiffs and their counsel. 
B. UDOT shall determine if relocation and other assistance will be available for 
each of the Plaintiffs, and shall offer to the Plaintiffs the amount of assistance available. 1 he 
amount of relocation assistance will be determined based on the criteria for assistance under the 
Uniform Act, although the payments will be made by UDOT without regard to the amount of 
assistance, if any, that may be received by UDOT. 
C In the event of an agreement with Plaintiffs on the amount of the offer, the 
amount of relocation expenses and other expenses, fees, moving expenses or other payments 
offered by UDOT, Delendant shall agree to pay to the Plaintiff the agiccd upon amount for the 
property within 30 days of the agreement unless a anothei time is sepaiately agieed. 
10. The Plaintiffs shall do the following: 
A. Following receipt of the appraisal and offer from UDOT, the Plaintiffs shall 
review the appraisals for accuracy and consistency and shall notify UDOT of any objections or 
errors that are believed to occurred. 
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D. After UDO V has responded to these objections, if any, the Plaintiffs shall each have 
thirty days to either accept the offer, request another appraisal or formal review of the appraisal, 
or elect to withdraw from the terms of this settlement Stipulation and the acquisition process, in 
accordance with the following procedures. 
L In the event that the offer is accepted, the Plaintiff will given written 
notice of acceptance to the Defendant, and a stipulated motion for dismissal shall 
be executed and submitted to the court piior to payment. 
ii. In the event that the Plaintiff elects to have the property re-appraised, 
Or to have the review appraisal prepared, the Plaintiff shall pay for the cost of the 
re-appraisal or of the new appraisal, and the new or review appiaiser shall be 
selected from a list of approved appraisers provided by the Defendant. Upon 
receipt of the second appraisal the parties agtcc to be bound by the average of the 
two appraisals, or to elect to withdraw from the stipulation process. 
iii. In the event that the Plaintiff elects to withdiaw fiom this Stipulation, 
then neither party shall be bound by this agicement, and the values determined by 
appraisal, the relocation costs, and all agreements and offers made heieundcr shall 
noi DC admissible in any subsequent litigation for any puipose without the consent 
of both parties. 
11. Plaintiffs counsel may move the court for a determination of the appropriate fee as 
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part of the motion for approval of this Stipulation. Defendant reserves the right to contest 
liability for any attorney's fees. 
12. It is the understanding of the parlies that if the amount of funds available from that 
source is inadequate to acquire the properties by the date designated, that this Stipulation may be 
extended by UDOT for an additional term of 180 days or shall become void and of no effect as to 
the Plaintiffs and properties that arc not able to be purchased within the time designated. If the 
plaintiffs1 properties are not acquired due to the unavailability of funds, this action shall be 
subject to a motion to reopen and to recommence litigation as to that property or properties 
without prejudice. 
13. This Stipulation represents the entire agreement of the parties and there arc no 
collateral agreements either verbal or written thai supplement this Agreement except as 
referenced herein. 
14. This agreement is to be binding and enforceable against the successors and assigns of 
cither party. 
15. This entire agreement is intended as a settlement proposal and agreement thai shall 
not be admissible in whole or in part in the event of subsequent litigation between these parties 
over the subject matter of this dispute or in any other litigation between UDOT and any possible 
member of the alleged class. 
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STATE of Utah and its Agency the Utah Department 
of Transportation, Defendants 
and Appellees. 
No. 990206. 
March 6, 2001. 
Rehearing Denied March 2, 2001. 
Landowners sought attorney fees after settling inverse 
condemnation action arising out of federally funded 
highway project. The Second District Court, Davis 
County, Glen R. Dawson, J., denied motion. 
Landowners appealed. The Supreme Court, Durrant, J., 
held that: (1) DOT was not an "executive department" 
within the meaning of the separation of powers clause 
prohibiting one department from exercising powers of 
another department, and (2) DOT regulation that 
incorporated by reference federal regulation entitling a 
landowner to attorney fees incurred in an inverse 
condemnation case was valid exercise of delegated 
authority. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
JU Appeal and Error €^>842(2) 
30k842(2) Most Cited Cases 
The Supreme Court gives no deference to the trial 
court's legal conclusions, but reviews them for 
correctness. 
Copr. ©West 2004 No 
[21 Costs €=^194.16 
102kl94.16 Most Cited Cases 
Attorney fees are recoverable if provided for by statute. 
131 Costs €=^194.16 
102kl94.16 Most Cited Cases 
Authorization 
Administrative rules are the same as statutory sources 
for an award of attorney fees. 
[41 Eminent Domain €^>316 
148k316 Most Cited Cases 
Even a meritless inverse condemnation action entitled 
the landowners to attorney fees under Department of 
Transportation (DOT) regulation that incorporated by 
reference federal regulation entitling a landowner to 
attorney fees incurred in an inverse condemnation case 
settled by the DOT. 49 C.F.R. g 24.107; Utah Admin. 
CodeR933-l-l. 
[51 Constitutional Law C=>76 
92k76 Most Cited Cases 
Department of Transportation (DOT) was not an 
"executive department" within the meaning of the 
separation of powers clause prohibiting one department 
from exercising powers of another department, and, 
thus, the DOT could engage in rulemaking. Const. Art. 
5,8 1: Art. 7,8 1. 
161 Constitutional Law € ^ 6 2 ( 1 ) 
92k62(l) Most Cited Cases 
Constitutional provision which vests legislative power 
in the legislature does restrict the ability of the 
legislature to delegate legislative functions to 
administrative agencies. Const. Art. 6, § 1. 
121 Constitutional Law €^>62(3) 
92k62(3) Most Cited Cases 
Because the constitution vests the legislative power in 
the legislature, administrative agencies may only effect 
policy mandated by statute and cannot exercise a 
sweeping power to create whatever rules they deem 
necessary. Const. Art. 6, § 1. 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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181 Constitutional Law ^==>62(2) 
92k62(2) Most Cited Cases 
Where the legislature delegates to an administrative 
agency power to make rules and regulations, such 
delegation must be accompanied by a declared policy 
outlining the field within which such rules and 
regulations may be adopted. Const. Art. 6, § 1. 
1?1 Constitutional Law €=>62(7) 
92k62(7) Most Cited Cases 
[91 Eminent Domain € ^ 3 1 6 
148k316 Most Cited Cases 
Legislature provided adequate direction and properly 
delegated to the Department of Transportation (DOT) 
the authority to incorporate federal regulations by 
reference, including a requirement to pay attorney fees 
incurred by a landowner in an inverse condemnation 
case; statutes require the DOT to cooperate with the 
federal government in all federal-aid projects and allow 
the DOT to incorporate federal regulations by 
reference. Const. Art. 6, § 1; U.C.A.1953, 63-46a-2, 
63-46a-3(7)(a), 72-1- 20h 72-1-208(2); 49 C.F.R. § 
24.107; Utah Admin. Code R933-1-1. 
[101 States €=^215 
360k215 Most Cited Cases 
An agency rule may impose liability on the state for 
attorney fees and costs; the potential sources of the 
state's liability for costs are not limited to statute or 
court rule. 
fill States €^>215 
360k215 Most Cited Cases 
Department of Transportation (DOT) regulation that 
incorporated by reference federal regulation entitling a 
landowner to attorney fees incurred in an inverse 
condemnation case satisfied the standard for clearly 
expressing the state sovereign's liability for costs; the 
regulation expressly provided that the owner would be 
reimbursed for attorney fees where the DOT settled an 
inverse condemnation action. 49 C.F.R. § 24.107; 
Utah Admin. Code R933-1- 1. 
[121 Constitutional Law €^>62(7) 
92k62(7) Most Cited Cases 
[121 Eminent Domain €=^>316 
148k316 Most Cited Cases 
Department of Transportation (DOT) regulation that 
incorporated by reference federal regulation entitling a 
landowner to attorney fees incurred in an inverse 
condemnation case was consistent with its delegated 
authority and governing statutes which require 
cooperation with the federal government in federal aid 
projects; the DOT had no discretion in determining 
whether to follow the mandates of the Uniform 
Relocation Assistance Real Property Acquisition 
Procedures Act and its regulations. Uniform Relocation 
Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act 
of 1970, §§ 101-305, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4601-4655; 
U.C.A. 1953, 63-46a-2, 63-46a-3(7)(a), 72-1-201, 72: 
1-208(2). 
[131 Constitutional Law €^=>62(2) 
92k62(2) Most Cited Cases 
The legislature need not specifically address each issue 
that may arise when an agency actually implements the 
policy, especially where the administrative agency 
lacks any real discretion in implementing the policy. 
[141 Constitutional Law €^>281 
92k281 Most Cited Cases 
[141 Eminent Domain €=>316 
148k316 Most Cited Cases 
Department of Transportation (DOT) regulation was 
not made unconstitutionally vague by its incorporation 
by reference to federal regulation entitling a landowner 
to attorney fees incurred in an inverse condemnation 
case. 49 C.F.R. § 24.107; Utah Admin. Code 
R933-1-1. 
*397 Douglas M. Durbano, George W. Burbidge, II, 
Layton; Randon W. Wilson, Vincent C. Rampton, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiffs. 
Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Steven F. Alder, Asst. Att'y 
Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendants. 
DURRANT, Justice: 
If 1 Appellants, a group of landowners, filed an inverse 
condemnation action against the State of Utah and its 
agency, the Utah Department of Transportation 
(collectively "UDOT"). The case settled before trial, 
but the question of whether appellants were entitled to 
an award of attorney fees was left open. The district 
court denied appellants' motion for an award of attorney 
fees, and appellants appeal that decision. We reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
% 2 U.S. Highway 89 spans the length of Utah from 
Arizona to Idaho, connecting most of this state's 
populated areas. At some point in the early 1980s, 
UDOT determined that the Highway 89 corridor 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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between Farmington and South Ogden needed 
significant expansion and improvements to increase 
public safety. To this end, UDOT began exploring 
potential alternatives, holding public meetings, and 
conducting a "scoping study." In compliance with the 
National Environmental Policy Act, UDOT prepared an 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the project. 
An initial draft was completed in December 1995, and 
the Final EIS was issued on September 9, 1996. 
If 3 The EIS revealed UDOT's preferred alternative for 
improvements as well as other options. Further, the 
EIS specifically "identified *398 136 houses, 22 
businesses, and numerous public properties and 
buildings, that may be impacted to some degree by the 
preferred alternative." Appellants' homes were among 
these specifically identified properties. 
If 4 UDOT anticipated the project would be broken up 
into several stages as budgetary constraints allowed. 
Because of the uncertainty of state and federal funding, 
no dates were set for either the beginning or completion 
of any stage of the project or for the acquisition of any 
affected property. The exact extent and nature of 
improvements remain undetermined. At present, some 
work has already begun; however, the entire project 
may not be completed for more than ten years. 
f 5 After publication of the Final EIS, appellants 
attempted to sell their homes. The contemplated sales 
were not prompted by UDOT's proposed expansion of 
the highway, but rather, by reasons such as job 
relocations and health concerns. Appellants claim they 
were unable to sell their properties for market value, 
however, because, "as a direct and proximate result of 
[UDOT's] actions in identifying [appellants'] property 
[in the EIS], the value and marketability of the property 
ha[d] been negatively impacted." Therefore, appellants 
asked UDOT to purchase their homes at fair market 
value. The parties were unable to come to terms, 
however, and appellants sued UDOT claiming inverse 
condemnation. Before trial, the parties stipulated that 
UDOT would purchase appellants' homes at mutually 
agreeable prices. The stipulation was approved by the 
trial court. Because the stipulation did not address the 
question of attorney fees, appellants filed a Motion for 
an Award of Attorney Fees. The district court denied 
the motion; appellants appeal that decision. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
H1116 In arguing the motion for an award of attorney 
fees, the parties relied on their pleadings and also 
submitted affidavits to the district court. "Where 
outside matters are 'presented to and not excluded by 
the court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 
56....'" Swenson v. Erickson, 2000 UT 16,18,998 P.2d 
807 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)). Accordingly, "we 
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party and affirm only where it appears that 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material issues of 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." Id. % 10 (citing Thayne v. Beneficial 
Utah, Inc.. 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994)). We give 
no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions, 
reviewing them, instead, for correctness. See id. 
(citing Geisdorfv. Doughty. 972 P.2d 67, 69-70 (Utah 
1998)). 
DISCUSSION 
If 7 Appellants rely upon both federal and state law for 
their contention that they are entitled to attorney fees. 
As to federal law, they assert that UDOT is required to 
pay their fees under the Uniform Relocation Assistance 
Real Property Acquisition Procedures Act, 42U.S.C.A. 
§§ 4601-4655 (1995 & Supp.2000) (the "Uniform 
Act"), and the federal regulations that implement the 
Uniform Act. In response, UDOT argues, inter alia, that 
the Uniform Act and its implementing regulations do 
not provide individuals with a cause of action for 
attorney fees, but merely define the relationship 
between state and federal agencies. 
[2][3] f 8 As to state law, appellants argue that even if 
the Uniform Act and its regulations do not directly 
entitle them to attorney fees, they are so entitled by 
virtue of the Utah Administrative Code, [FN 11 in which 
UDOT has adopted wholesale those same federal 
regulations. JPN2] We agree. Because we rely on state 
law in deciding this case, we do *399 not reach the 
question of whether federal law also provides a basis 
for the award of fees. 
FN1. Under Utah law, an award of attorney 
fees is recoverable if it is provided for by 
statute. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 
P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). Since state 
administrative rules are implemented pursuant 
to statutory authority and have the force and 
effect of law, see, e.g., Morton v. State Ret. 
Bd. 842 P.2d 928, 932 n. 2 (Utah 
Ct.App.1992), we consider them as we would 
statutory sources for an award of attorney 
fees. 
FN2. The federal regulations were adopted by 
rule 933-1-1 of the Utah Administrative Code, 
which provides as follows: "The State of Utah 
incorporates by reference 49 CFR 24 as 
amended in the Federal Register, March 2, 
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1989, as its administrative rules on the 
acquisition of rights of way." 
I. APPLICABILITY OF 49 C.F.R. § 24.107 TO 
THE SETTLEMENT AT ISSUE 
H 9 We first consider the question of whether 49C.F.R. 
§ 24.107, as adopted by Rule 933-1-1 of the Utah 
Administrative Code, requires, on its face, the payment 
of attorney fees in circumstances such as are presented 
in this case. Section 24.107 applies "to any acquisition 
of real property for ... programs and projects where 
there is Federal financial assistance [FN31 in any part 
of project costs...." 49 C.F.R. § 24.101(a) (1995). In this 
case, the parties stipulated, for the purposes of the 
motion for an award of attorney fees, that the U.S. 
Highway 89 expansion and improvement project would 
be "a federally funded state project." 
FN3. "The term Federal financial assistance 
means a grant, loan, or contribution provided 
by the United States...." 49 C.F.R. $ 24.2(j) 
(1995). 
141K 10 Section 24.107 provides that "[t]he owner of 
the real property shall be reimbursed for any ... 
reasonable attorney ... fees, which the owner actually 
incurred because of a condemnation proceeding, if: ... 
(c) The court having jurisdiction renders a judgment in 
favor of the owner in an inverse condemnation 
proceeding, or the Agency effects a settlement of such 
proceeding." Id. § 24.107 (emphasis added). 
Appellants' complaint includes a claim that UDOT had 
inversely condemned their property. That lawsuit was 
settled and UDOT "agreed to purchase Plaintiffs' homes 
immediately at mutually agreeable prices." Thus, this 
case is squarely within the language of section 24.107. 
IFN41 
FN4. UDOT contests this conclusion by 
arguing that the inverse condemnation 
proceeding lacked merit. The settlement of 
such a proceeding is covered by the plain 
language of section 24.107, however, 
regardless of the merit of the underlying 
claim. Similarly, it is irrelevant whether 
UDOT planned to acquire appellants' property 
because of the hardship appellants were under 
and not because it felt the Uniform Act, the 
federal regulations implementing the Uniform 
Act, or the Utah Administrative Code 
compelled it. It remains a settlement of an 
inverse condemnation proceeding, and, 
Copr. ©West 2004 No ( 
therefore, 49 C.F.R. § 24.107 governs. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UDOTS 
ADOPTION OF 49 C.F.R. §24.107 
K 11 Having concluded that Section 24.107, as adopted 
by rule 933-1-1, requires the payment of attorney fees, 
we next address the constitutionality of rule 933-1-1's 
adoption of section 24.107. UDOT contends that it 
unconstitutionally exceeded its own authority in 
adopting the federal regulations that implement the 
Uniform Act. In so doing, UDOT finds itself in the 
unenviable position of arguing that it is not bound by its 
own rule. We disagree and hold that UDOT is bound 
by Rule 933-1-1. 
A. Article V, Section I 
£5J^112 UDOT contends that article V. section 1 of the 
Utah Constitution limits UDOT's rulemaking authority. 
That section provides as follows: 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah 
shall be divided into three distinct departments, the 
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no 
person charged with the exercise of powers properly 
belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise 
any functions appertaining to either of the others, 
except in the cases herein expressly directed or 
permitted. 
Utah Const, art. V, § 1 (emphasis added). In adopting 
section 24.107, UDOT engaged in the legislative 
function of rulemaking. UDOT contends that, as an 
executive branch agency, it was precluded from doing 
so by article V, section 1. This argument fails, however, 
because UDOT is not a part of the executive branch for 
purposes of article V, section 1. The constitution itself 
defines those "persons" who are deemed to be a part of 
the Executive Department, and that definition does not 
include administrative agencies. See Utah Const, art. 
VII, £__[. Addressing this question in State v Gallion, 
572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977), we held as follows: 
*400 Since the inhibitions of the Article V, Section 
i , are directed toward specific "persons," there is 
nothing to restrain the legislative department from 
creating administrative bodies to exercise legislative 
functions, viz., rule making. Although 
administrative bodies are nominally designated a part 
of the executive branch, they do not fall within the 
Constitutional definition of the Executive Department 
and the prohibition of Article V, Section I does not 
apply thereto. 
Id. at 687. We see no reason, and UDOT provides 
none, for departing from this interpretation. Therefore, 
we hold that article V, section 1 does not limit UDOTs 
authority, as an administrative body, to make rules. 
B. Article VI Section I 
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f 13 UDOT further contends that its rulemaking 
authority is limited by article VL section 1 of the Utah 
Constitution, which, in pertinent part, vests "[t]he 
Legislative power of the State ... [i]n... the Legislature 
of the State of Utah...." Utah Const, art. VI, i_L Under 
this argument, even if UDOT is not constitutionally a 
part of the executive branch for purposes of article V, 
section 1, it is, nevertheless, precluded by article VL 
section 1 from exercising legislative power because it 
is not a part of the legislature either. The first question 
that arises in this regard is whether the legislative 
power of rulemaking was properly delegated by the 
legislature to UDOT. 
161171181191 % 14 Article VL section 1 does restrict the 
ability of the legislature to delegate legislative functions 
to administrative agencies. See Gal I ion, 572 P. 2d at 
687 (noting that while article V, section 1 does not 
"proscribe the delegation of legislative power,... under 
Article VI, Section 1, there are limitations in this regard 
..."). Because the constitution vests the legislative 
power in the legislature, administrative agencies may 
only effect policy mandated by statute and cannot 
exercise a sweeping power to create whatever rules 
they deem necessary. See State v. Goss, 79 Utah 559, 
11 P.2d 340. 341-44(1932). Accordingly, "[wlhere 
the legislature delegates to an administrative agency 
power to make rules and regulations, such delegation 
must be accompanied by a declared policy outlining the 
field within which such rules and regulations may be 
adopted." Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, 96 Utah 450, 85 
P.2d 831, 834 (1939). The question then becomes 
whether the legislature expressed a policy that 
adequately directed UDOT in enacting rule 933-1-1. 
We hold that it did. 
f 15 Section 72-1-201 of the Utah Code "create[s] the 
Department of Transportation which shall: ... (8) in 
accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act, make policy and rules 
for the administration of the department, state 
transportation systems, and programs." Utah Code 
Ann. § 72-1-201 (Supp.2000). Thus, the legislature 
specifically granted UDOT the power to enact 
administrative rules. An agency "rule" is defined as 
"an agency's written statement that... (i) is explicitly or 
implicitly required by state or federal statute or other 
applicable law; (ii) has the effect of law; (iii) 
implements or interprets a state or federal legal 
mandate; and (iv) applies to a class of persons or 
another agency." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-2(T6)(a) 
(1997). Together, these sections evince a legislative 
intent that UDOT enact rules to comply with federal 
mandates. 
f 16 And more specifically, section 72-1-208(2) of the 
Utah Code requires that UDOT, "with the approval of 
the governor, shall cooperate with the federal 
government in all federal-aid projects and with all state 
departments in all matters in connection with the use of 
the highways." Utah Code Ann. $ 72- 1-208(2) 
(Supp.2000) (emphasis added). In so cooperating, the 
legislature allows UDOT to "incorporate[ ] by reference 
... regulation[s] that ha[ve] been adopted by a federal 
agency...." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-3(7)(a) 
(Supp.2000). Read together, these statutes demonstrate 
a clear delegation by the legislature to UDOT of 
rulemaking authority, as well as a legislative policy 
directing UDOT to comply with federal mandates for 
federal-aid proj ects. 
TJ 17 UDOTs wholesale adoption of the regulations 
implementing the Uniform Act complies with the 
federal mandate that, in order to receive federal 
financial assistance, a state agency must either (1) give 
assurances *401 to the federal government that it will 
comply with the Uniform Act and the federal 
regulations implementing the Uniform Act or (2) certify 
with the Federal Highway Administration that it will act 
according to State laws that are equivalent to the 
Uniform Act in purpose and effect. See 49 C.F.R. § 
24.4(a)(1) (1995) (requiring assurances); 49 C.F.R. §§ 
24.601-.602 (1995) (discussing the certification 
process). In light of the clear legislative policy of 
compliance with federal mandates in such a situation, 
the UDOT rule is not in conflict with Article VL 
section L of the Utah Constitution. The power to 
make such a rule was properly delegated by the 
legislature to UDOT. 
III. STANDARD FOR CREATION OF ATTORNEY 
FEE LIABILITY 
f 18 UDOT next argues that beyond the normal 
legislative authorization required by article VL section 
1 of the Utah Constitution for an administrative agency 
to enact a rule, when the agency seeks to enact a rule 
creating attorney fee liability its legislative 
authorization must be explicit or clearly implied. In 
support of this argument, UDOT relies on Tracy v. 
Peterson. 1 Utah 2d 213, 265 P.2d 393 (1954). 
1119 In Tracy, the trial court imposed costs on the state 
pursuant to rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which allows costs to be awarded to the 
prevailing party. We concluded that this rule provided 
an insufficient basis for awarding costs against the 
state, holding that "[t]he sovereign is not liable for costs 
unless there is some statute or rule of court which 
expressly or by clear implication includes it.... The 
general terms of a statute giving costs to the prevailing 
party do not include the sovereign." Id. at 396. 
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f 20 UDOT contends that Tracy 's analysis as to an 
award of costs would apply a fortiori to an award of 
attorney fees against the sovereign. From this UDOT 
concludes that it exceeded its own authority in enacting 
a rule creating attorney fee liability because it did not 
have "clear and explicit statutory authorization" to do 
so. 
[101 H 21 Assuming, without deciding, that Tracy 
applies a fortiori to an award of attorney fees, we 
nevertheless conclude that UDOTs reliance on Tracy is 
misplaced. Tracy does not purport to limit the potential 
sources of costs liability to statute or court rule, thereby 
precluding an agency rule as a source of costs liability. 
Although Tracy referred to statutes and rules of court 
as the most typical sources of costs liability, it did not 
address the question of what other sources of law might 
provide a legitimate basis for an award of costs. 
Instead, Tracy propounds a rule of interpretive 
construction that limits the role of a court in imposing 
costs liability on the state, but that does not necessarily 
limit the role of an administrative agency in enacting a 
rule imposing such liability on the state. In the case at 
hand, UDOT has enacted a rule providing for attorney 
fee liability. The Tracy standard is a limitation on our 
latitude in interpreting that rule, not on UDOTs 
authority to make the rule. We can impose attorney fee 
liability on UDOT only if the rule it enacted expressly 
or by clear implication created such liability. A 
different standard applies to UDOT's enactment of that 
rule, however. We have held that an agency's rules need 
only "be consistent with its governing statutes." 
Sanders Brine Shrimp v. Audit Div. of the Utah State 
Tax Comm'n, 846 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Utah 1993) 
(emphasis added). Accordingly, as long as " 'thepolicy 
and purpose of the legislation are clearly expressed, the 
absence of detailed standards in legislation will not 
necessarily render it invalid as an unlawful delegation 
of legislative authority.' " Opinion of the Justices to the 
Senate, 422 Mass. 1201, 660 N.E.2d 652, 658 (1996) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Chelmsford Trailer Park 
Inc. v. Chelmsford. 393 Mass. 186, 469 N.E.2d 1259, 
1262 (1984)). 
fill f 22 With these standards in mind, we turn to the 
statute and administrative rule at issue in the case at 
hand. Again, assuming that Tracy applies a fortiori to 
an award of attorney fees, we first consider the question 
of whether section 24.107, as adopted by UDOT in rule 
933-1-1, satisfies the Tracy standard. Clearly, it does. 
It expressly provides that the owner of real property 
shall be reimbursed for attorney *402 fees where an 
agency settles a condemnation action. 
ri21f!31 f 23 We next consider the question of whether 
UDOT's adoption of this section was consistent with its 
governing statutes. Those statutes include a clear 
legislative policy to cooperate with the federal 
government on federal-aid projects. It is unnecessary 
for the legislature to specifically address each issue that 
may arise when an agency actually implements the 
policy. This is especially true where, as here, the 
administrative agency lacks any real discretion in 
implementing the policy. The legislature dictated that 
UDOT must comply with federal mandates and, more 
specifically, cooperate with the federal government in 
federal aid projects. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46a-2, 
72-1-201, and 72-1-208(2). In light of these directives, 
UDOT had no discretion in determining whether to 
follow the mandates of the Uniform Act and its 
implementing regulations. By adopting a rule that 
complied with federal requirements, UDOT acted 
consistently with the legislative directives of sections 
72-1-201,63-46a-2, and 72-1 -208(2) of the Utah Code. 
We decline to apply a more rigorous standard to an 
agency's rulemaking solely because that rulemaking 
creates attorney fee liability, and conclude that UDOTs 
adoption of a rule creating attorney fee liability was 
consistent with the authority delegated to it by the 
legislature. 
IV. VAGUENESS 
£14] f 24 Finally, UDOT contends that the 
administrative rule itself is too vague to create liability 
as it only incorporates by reference the federal 
regulations. We find no merit in this. As incorporated 
in the Utah Administrative Code, these regulations 
specifically and clearly create a right to an award of 
attorney fees in settlements of condemnation 
proceedings. Therefore, the UDOT regulations are 
valid. 
CONCLUSION 
1f 25 The district court erred in denying appellants' 
motion for an award of attorney fees. The Utah 
Administrative Code mandates an award of a plaintiffs 
attorney fees where UDOT settles the plaintiffs inverse 
condemnation action. We remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
K 26 Chief Justice HOWE, Associate Chief Justice 
RUSSON, Justice DURHAM, and Justice WILKINS 
concur in Justice DURRANT's opinion. 
20 P.3d 396, 416 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2001 UT 21 
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EXHIBIT C 
Steven F. Alder (#0033) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Mark L Shurtfeff (#4666) 
Attorney General 
Attorneys For Plaintiff 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O.Box 140857 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857 
Telephone- (801)366-0216 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KAY K. ROBINSON; VANE R and 
MARILEE L. SCADDEN; BENJAMIN E. 
and LE JOIE REICHEL; acting in their own 
behalf and for all other parties interested or 
otherwise similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH and its Agency THE 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON MOTION IN LIMINE 
Civil No. 970700484 
Judge Glenn R. Dawson 
Defendant's Motion in Limine having been heard by the court on February 22, 2002 at 
9:00 a.m., and the court having heard argument of counse! and being fully knowledgeable of the 
law and the facts makes the following: 
Findings of Fact 
1. This matter was filed November 18, 1997 by the named Plaintiffs; Kay Robinson, 
Vane and Marilee Scadden, and Benjamine and LeJoie Reichel; and alleged inter alia to be a 
class action. 
2 On March 26, 2001 the parties reached a settlement of the matter on behalf of the 
named Plaintiffs Kay Robinson, Vane and Marilee Scadden, and Benjamine and LeJoie Reichel 
and two additional persons, Harland and Ardena Taylor. 
3. The Stipulation to Dismissal was presented at a hearing held May 18, 1998 in 
accordance with Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and approved by an Order signed 
on June 4, 1998. 
4. Only four property owners were to be governed by the Stipulation to Dismissal 
settling this inverse action and all other persons including potential class members were not 
bound by its terms and were free to pursue any other remedies against the Defendant. 
Conclusions of Law 
1. This case has been remanded to the trial court by the Utah Supreme Court for a 
determination of a reasonable attorneys fee to be awarded to the plaintiffs in this matter. 
2. This court has no jurisdiction in this action over any person except the four 
property owners bound by the Stipulation. 
3. Attorneys fees are recoverable in this matter, only on behalf of the four property 
owners, who are parties to the Stipulation, and evidence of attorney fees will be limited to that 
evidence that is relevant to the attorney fee claims of the four named property owners. 
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby Ordered as follows: 
1. The parties are to complete their designation of witnesses and shall limit 
witnesses to those persons who will testify concerning the legal work and attorney fees on behalf 
of the four property owners identified in the Stipulation to Dismissal; to wit: Kay Robinson, 
Vane and Manlee Scadden, Benjamine and LeJoie Reichel, and Harland and Ardena Taylor. 
2. The parties are to complete all discovery including the exchange of expert reports 
and the deposition of expert witnesses or other predicate witnesses to the experts no later than 60 
days from this Order. 
3. A Final Pretrial Order shall be submitted by April 8, 2002 and a Final Pre-trial 
Conference shall be held April j6, 2002 at 11:00 a.m. at which time a trial date shall be set. 
DATED this t ^ d a y of March, 2002. 
BY THE COURT 
EXHIBIT D 
Westlaw 
49 CFR§ 24.107 
49 C.F.R. §24.107 
c 
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
TITLE 49-TRANSPORTATION 
SUBTITLE A-OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 
OF TRANSPORTATION 
PART 24--UNIFORM RELOCATION 
ASSISTANCE AND REAL PROPERTY 
ACQUISITION FOR 
FEDERAL AND FEDERALLY ASSISTED 
PROGRAMS 
SUBPART B-REAL PROPERTY 
ACQUISITION 
Current through July 14, 2004; 69 FR 42274 
§ 24.107 Certain litigation expenses. 
The owner of the real property shall be reimbursed for 
any reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorney, 
appraisal, and engineering fees, which the owner 
actually incurred because of a condemnation 
proceeding, if: 
(a) The final judgment of the court is that the Agency 
cannot acquire the real property by condemnation; or 
(b) The condemnation proceeding is abandoned by the 
Agency other than under an agreed-upon settlement; or 
(c) The court having jurisdiction renders a judgment in 
favor of the owner in an inverse condemnation 
proceeding or the Agency effects a settlement of such 
proceeding. 
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, 
or Tables> 
49C. F.R. § 24.107 
49 CFR § 24.107 
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